Actions intended to appear outrageous

What intensifies the guilt of this court siding unjustly with the other side is that a big part of what the defendants did was made and intended to be shown as an outrageous thing to shareholders. Those inside were playing a game for the hedge fund guy to scare shareholders . The hedge fund guy doesn't need to be worried about SEC reaction to anything he does and that is why he did not care about how clearly  outrageous the actions he was making those inside do. So, when a judge look at these actions and the calling of justice dose not make him feel agitated and ask what the hell going on and resist a temptation to run after the defendants with a stick then he is probably in the wrong profession. 

An illustrating example

What happened in this court is also an example for an important distinction I wanted to make.

It is very probable that one may not find any discriminating personal opinion this judge has against my belonging to whatever I belong to, yet his actions were far from applying justice . I would rather have a judge with a discriminating personal view or expectations toward any kind of group I belong who apply justice and return my rights than a judge who is only good with his personal opinion.

Of course it is even better to have both qualities but I see here that concentration on secondary things eclipses seeing the importance of the question of justice although it is what empowers the significance of these secondary things.

It is probably for similar reasons that some black people were laughing about that fake show with the butter lady. It is as if they were saying: Oh, yes we see no injustice anywhere around us and that is why someone who once used a word we don't like should be a huge problem for us, LOL.   

The audacity of this corruption

It is astonishing that the hedge fund guy was still able to pull strings and make that court do the clearly outrageous things it did despite how it is well known that I brought the matter to the attention and watch of the highest institution in the land, the congress. The audacity of this corruption shows how deeply troubled this justice system when matters come to the like of this hedge fund and the power and control they have over that system.       

This district court was a joke

Time to go to the appeal court and see if it is a circuit court or also a circus court for this hedge fund guy to play his acrobatic games defying justice and the law.

Case closed

Last Monday the district court closed my case (13-20190-CIV-GRAHAM/GOODMAN) by dismissing the rest of  my case against two remaining defendants .But here is the thing. The dismissal order did not state that it was without prejudice and according to FRCP 41 generally dismissals without stating it is without prejudice means it is with prejudice. Nevertheless, although the dismissal stated not following court orders as the reason, these orders were related to serving the complaint and therefore just something that masked a dismissal according to FRCP Rule 4(m) for failure to serve the complaint within the 120 days time period which specify dismissal without prejudice. 

 

After all the earlier dismissals this court did, it suddenly issued orders giving me time to serve (and re-serve after it quashed my earlier service) the two remaining defendants as if that matter any more (one of those defendants, Dror Svorai ,  even limited himself to  mentioning only the county part of the address of where he alleges to reside in his affidavit asking to quash the service). 

 

Unlike motions from other defendants, the motion by defendant Dror Svorai did not ask for a dismissal and asked only for quashing the service so one can certainly put a theory that this was planned.

Court Order Closing The Case 

Court's order quashing service of process

On July 22 2013 the court issued an order granting defendant's Dror Svorai motion to quash service.
Here are links to the defendant's motion, my answer, and the court's order. 

Defendant Dror's motion to quash service

Answer to the defendant's motion

Court's order granting the motion to quash

Court's third dismissal

The third dismissal by this district court was related to Defendant Onteco Corporation, the main defendant, and was based on FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) and FRCP 9(b) and that I lack standing to bring the suit directly.Here are links to the complaint, my response to the defendants motion, and the court order. My original response also has exhibits I am not including them here because they were in response to something on which that dismissal decision was not based. Notice also that if the defendant hadn't emailed me his motion then I may not care about adding a link to that motion.

Complaint

Answer to defendant's Onteco motion to dismiss

Court's third dismissal order

Another justice system corruption sample?

Although not exactly in your face corruption like the one going on in that federal court for the hedge fund guy against my case, take a look at this.

Garst, et al v. Lockheed Integrated, et al

The man spent four years but he still couldn't provide a claim sufficient for the court? It even appears that he was represented by lawyers and was not filing pro se. It is not just that failure but how that failure happened, as the appeal court's opinion claims, is what make this suspicion unavoidable. The conduct of the plaintiff seems more of that who is trying to reach the end of something than that of someone trying to achieve it.

Based on the little knowledge I have and very short history in law related matters, something is needed to counteract the strong suspicion that lawsuit appears to be actually an attempt to protect the corporation instead of holding it responsible. It seems as if there had been things that corporation had done which could harm it  legally and in order to protect that corporation this plan was implemented. The plan appears to be to file a lawsuit mentioning these claims, or a lawsuit where these claims should have been mentioned, in an insufficient, messed up complaint to have it dismissed in a way enough to prevent the claims the corporation wanted to avoid from being brought again because of res judicata and collateral estoppel (the inability to bring again claims that were brought or should have been brought in a previous case that reached judgment on the merits). In other words the plaintiff was plaintiff only by name while actually working for the defendant. That of course assuming the complaint was really insufficient as described by the court otherwise the corruption is directly from the courts.         

Did anyone investigate this? Am I missing something or is it just another sample of the magnitude in government corruption when things come to the powerful and connected protecting themselves through illegitimate means? Why didn't the courts signal some kind of a suspicion or make a judgment based on that suspicion in order to foul such possible plan?

It is also strange that the district court judge waited that long then dismissed the case with prejudice. Why would one prefer such path over a little patience then dismissal without prejudice? I cant find it easy to believe that district court was not involved.

I went to the PACER website but couldn't read the documents related to this case. I also found that the first judge was changed after about one and a half year. I also found that the plaintiff himself was requesting to put the complaint under seal.  

How could this pass without suspicion  and investigation? Moreover, it is mentioned that this  court opinion was cited 173 times.

If I am justified in my suspicion about this case which I found despite the low number of cases I looked at and despite that I was not looking to find this kind of things, imagine what targeted extensive real search can show about the justice system in this regard.

By the way, the opinion of the circuit court was less than assuring of its honesty as it appears to me.

Courts here and standing in dilution cases-3

It seems that I applied the derivative test I suggested for dilution cases in the preceding post  more closely on cases similar to mine where there is a continuous authorization and issuing  of shares than on cases where there is issuing of shares in a limited authorized shares. I may return later to correct other things I said and write more about the mean subject here.

Courts here and standing in dilution cases-2

In my preceding post it seems that I made a mistake by stating that a corporation do not own itself which seems to conflict with the reasoning that allow ,for example,  public corporations to buyback their own shares in the market. Nevertheless, a corporation is owned by its shareholders and it is upon the opposing side to prove that issued  "authorized shares" are issued from the direct ownership of the corporation not shareholders who "authorize" the use of these shares for the corporation. 

 

Beside showing how the derivative standing seems to be very weak in comparison with the direct one for dilution cases, here is a test that emphasize that weakness. It seems that there is a condition that is necessary  for the existence of derivative injury (which imply injury to the corporation). That condition or test is achieved by simply imagining the corporation being sold to a new owner. If with that transformation of ownership the injury to the corporation would persist then this necessary condition (but may not be always sufficient) for the existence of a derivative standing is satisfied. That makes sense since if an injury was truly done to the corporation then it should stay with that corporation.  

 

If we apply this test to the dilution cases we can see that what was perceived as an injury to the corporation would seize to exist with the transfer of ownership of the corporation. First, whether the buyer buys the corporation from one or one thousand owners or acquire a hundred shares or a million shares to achieve the buying process that buyer will end owning the same corporation. Second, it also wouldn't matter to the buyer how many of the authorized shares remain since the buying entity can change that to whatever  it wants. 

 

While this doesn't seem to be even close to what the reasoning of all these courts may miss, I emphasize again that I have seen how corporations and those with the financial power may get preferred treatment here.       

Courts here and standing in dilution cases

I was writing  about the court's third dismissal when I found that  I see it as questionable thing and cannot understand  how courts deal with shareholder plaintiff standing in dilution cases.

 

Here is what one court states:

 

[Delaware case law states that "if a board of directors authorizes the issuance of stock for no or grossly inadequate consideration, the corporation is directly injured and shareholders are injured derivatively"] (In re J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 906 A.2d 808 (2005))

 

I don't see how that could be the best understanding for such situations?

 

Shareholders are the owners of the corporation and modifying the percentage of their ownership affect them directly.

 

My understanding is that a corporation is a legal entity that own assets but it does not own itself, at least when there exist owner(s) for it. When a corporation is sold the selling price would go to its owner(s) and not to the corporation itself. Dilution can be seen as selling of the corporation with the proceeds reinvested back in the corporation.

 

What about authorized shares in the article of incorporation? I think that understanding these shares as being owned by the corporation, if there exist such understanding, is a weak thing if not totally wrong. Instead, authorized shares can be understood as shares the board of directors is authorized to use for the benefit of  the corporation. While the corporation is the pre-assigned owner for the proceeds from selling or any benefit from these authorized shares, that still wouldn't mean only a derivative standing for cases challenging dilution by insiders. That is because the issuance of any authorized shares should not be fraudulent to shareholders and/or should not violate the fiduciary duty of the board to shareholders in order to be correctly done to be used for the benefit  of the corporation. Since dilution cases are usually based on challenging or questioning one or both of the two factors just mentioned, that means there is a direct standing to bring these lawsuits.  

 

I don't see anything indicating that authorized shares are authorized for issuance for the benefit of the corporation regardless or in exclusion of  the general requirement of  fiduciary duty or avoiding fraud to shareholders.

 

I understand the mentioning of  authorized shares with the assets of a corporation not as being  directly part of the assets but as a vehicle that is pre assigned to be used for the benefit of the corporation.

 

In addition, the derivative standing doesn't even make comparable sense in comparison to the direct shareholder standing when it comes to the injury suffered as a result of the dilution. First, shares could be issued at the best price possible and increase the assets of a corporation considerably but still injure shareholders if they were better before the issuance of those shares than after that or if the issuance of shares serve no purpose other than making the current shareholders share ownership with some other people.    

 

Second, even when shares are sold at low prices the dilution resulted from these low prices would still injure shareholders directly through dilution much more than it injures the corporation through the use of the authorized shares for these low prices. As long as authorized shares can be increased it wouldn't make much of a difference for a corporation whether it raise the same amount of money through the issuance of  hundred shares or million shares. Why continuous increase of authorizing and issuing of shares is not taken into account? Because it injures shareholders. So, as seen here, we took a full circle turn and ended back again to the direct injury to shareholders.     

 

About a year ago I was lacking the most basic understanding and knowledge for law related matters, so I don't know how failing to see that could be that common in courts and there could be an answer to what I wrote here. Nevertheless the current path work better for corporations and I have seen how things get adjusted here for the better benefit of those with the financial power and that is why I am questioning this.  

 

It also seems to me that incorrectly taking away the direct right to bring a lawsuit is a violation of the constitutional due process.